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Are Bailouts Inevitable?
Randall D. Guynnt
The "too systemically important to fail" problem is one of the most
intractable problems of our time. During the financial panic of 2008,
governments around the world decided to use taxpayer funds to rescue their
most important financial institutions rather than allow them to be liquidated at
fire-sale prices. Policymakers have developed measures to make future failures
less likely or severe. If failures nevertheless occur, however, regulators will
want to resolve systemically important institutions in a way that provides a
credible alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts. This Essay establishes an
economic model for testing when a proposed solution is credible. It applies that
test to proposals for a new Chapter 14 to the Bankruptcy Code and to the
FDIC's new resolution authority, examining especially the FDIC's possible use
of this authority to recapitalize the systemically important and viable parts of a
failed institution and liquidate the rest without cost to taxpayers.
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Introduction
During the global financial panic of 2008, most governments around the
world decided that it was better to rescue their most important banks and other
financial institutions than to allow them to be liquidated in a "disorderly"
manner. The governments shared the concern that a disorderly liquidation
could result in a severe destabilization or collapse of the financial system. In
other words, some financial institutions were "too systemically important to
fail" (TSTF). After the crisis faded, however, these decisions were followed by
populist outcries of "never again."' Policymakers have therefore been searching
for ways to make taxpayer-funded bailouts of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs) a thing of the past. This Essay discusses whether taxpayer-
funded bailouts are inevitable despite these efforts.
My central thesis is that bailouts of SIFIs need not be inevitable.2
However, the bailout problem is a difficult one to understand, much less solve.
It has significant cross-border dimensions, and its various solutions are not
cost-free. Most people tend to oversimplify the problem and its solutions: some
think that the problem is mainly a lack of political commitment to free market
principles,3 while others think it is a matter of excessive political influence by
Wall Street.4 Thus, the solution, according to these individuals, is principally a
matter of voting the right people into office,5 dampening the influence of Wall
Street,6 convincing shareholders and creditors that they will bear all the losses
1. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President, Weekly Address: President Obama Urges Congress To
Complete Work on Wall Street Reform Bill (June 26, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/weekly-address-president-obama-urges-congress-complete-work-wall-street-reform-bill
(reflecting populist outcries to ensure that "Main Street is never again held responsible for Wall Street's
mistakes" (emphasis added)).
2. See Debate Between Paul Mahoney, Dean, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Randall D.
Guynn, Partner and Head, Fin. Insts. Grp., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, at the University of Virginia
Law School (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiOvMR5rvMY.
3. See, e.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: How GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND
INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 25-30 (2009); THOMAS
E. WOODS, MELTDOWN: A FREE-MARKET LOOK AT WHY THE STOCK MARKET COLLAPSED, THE
ECONOMY TANKED, AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS WILL MAKE THINGS WORSE 1, 6-8, 141-58 (2009).
4. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 89-119 (2011).
5. See, e.g., DICK ARMEY & MATT KIBBE, GIVE US LIBERTY: A TEA PARTY MANIFESTO 101-
04, 133-35, 175-79 (2010).





from the insolvency of their firms or debtors,7 restricting lender-of-last-resort
facilities or debt guarantee programs,9 or breaking up the largest banks into
constellations of smaller banks.' 0
Part I of this Essay discusses the economics of bailouts and explains why
policymakers during the fall of 2008 believed that taxpayer-funded bailouts
were the lesser of two evils when compared to disorderly liquidations. It
concludes that the key to eliminating taxpayer-funded bailouts is to develop a
credible alternative that results in lower social costs than a bailout or a
disorderly liquidation. Part II examines proposed solutions to the bailout
problem, including ex ante solutions that focus on reducing the likelihood of a
SIFI failure and ex post solutions that focus on minimizing the social costs of
failure. Part III analyzes why attempts to liquidate or reorganize a SIFI under
the existing Bankruptcy Code during a financial panic can result in disorderly
liquidations, especially if the SIFI has significant cross-border operations. It
also explains why a proposed new Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
was designed specifically for nonbank SIFIs, does not go far enough to provide
a credible alternative to bailouts. Part IV describes how the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can use its bank and nonbank resolution
authorities," including recapitalization within resolution, to create a credible
alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts of bank and nonbank SIFIs during a
financial panic. This Part also discusses the importance of balancing the
extraordinary discretion that regulators must enjoy during a crisis with
enhanced due process protections, imposed by the FDIC (through rulemaking)
and Congress (through legislation).
I. The Economics of Bailouts
FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair described the TSTF problem during the fall
of 2008 as a choice between two evils-a taxpayer-funded bailout or a
"disorderly liquidation" of a SIFI that would risk a collapse of the financial
7. See, e.g., David Skeel, Give Bankruptcy a Chance, WKLY. STANDARD, June 29, 2009,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/658hmvhc.asp; Sheila Bair,
Chairman, FDIC, Glauber Lecture at the John F. Kennedy, Jr. Forum, Harvard University: Ending Too
Big To Fail: The FDIC and Financial Reform (Oct. 20, 2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spoct2l10.html.
8. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -
203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1375, 2113-15 (2010) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 343) (limiting the Federal
Reserve's emergency lending authority under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act).
9. See, e.g., id. §§ 1104-06, 124 Stat. at 2120-26 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5611-5613).
10. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 4, at 208.
11. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act §§ 11, 13, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1823 (2006)
(establishing resolution authority for banks); Dodd-Frank Act, tit. II, 124 Stat. at 1442-520 (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394) (establishing orderly liquidation authority for nonbank financial companies);
see also John L. Douglas & Randall D. Guynn, Resolution of US Banks and Other Financial
Institutions, in DEBT RESTRUCTURING 317 (Look Chan Ho & Nick Segal consultant eds., 2011).
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system.12 A severe destabilization of the financial system, in turn, would have
resulted in more serious, long-term harm to the wider economy, with potential
consequences ranging from higher unemployment, lower output, and excessive
regulation, to political instability, riots, increased risk of authoritarianism, and
even war.
The reason for this linkage between financial crises and broader economic
unsettlement is that most of the money and credit in a modem economy is
created by commercial banks and other private sector financial institutions,' 4
not by public central banks. Through the power of the money multiplier, every
dollar, euro, or other unit of central-bank money, is transformed into many
times that amount in other forms of money and credit.' 5 When depositors and
other short-term creditors panic and demand immediate repayment of their
funds, the amount of money and credit throughout the system contracts
dramatically and sometimes violently in inverse relation to the money
multiplier.16 Such a sudden and severe contraction of money and credit can be
compared to a scenario in which the lubricating oil in every car in the United
States were vaporized instantly: engines would be permanently damaged and
would not run again even if they were subsequently re-lubricated. According to
Chairman Bair, then, governments did not choose bailouts because they wanted
to offer bailouts: they looked into the abyss and chose bailouts as the lesser of
two evils.
In order to develop a credible alternative to these two evils, it is important
to define what we mean by "taxpayer-funded bailouts" and "disorderly
liquidations." People have used these terms in different ways, and have often
talked past each other as a result. Only when we agree on what the two evils are
can we describe a credible alternative.
12. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 63-64 (2010) (statement
of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC).
13. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 115-16 (2009). See generally Robert E. Hall, Why Does the Economy Fall
to Pieces After a Financial Crisis?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011, at 3 (examining theoretical models for
the familiar observation that even temporary financial crises cause persistent decreases in employment
and real gross domestic product).
14. See, e.g., GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 13-
17 (2010) (noting the role of the lightly regulated or unregulated shadow banking system); Morgan
Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, I HARv. BUS. L. REv. 75, 84-89 (2011).
15. See GORTON, supra note 14, at 15; JAMES R. KEARL, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 422-27, 792 (6th ed. 2011).
16. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867-1960, at 332-33 (1963); Ml Money Multiplier, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,





A taxpayer-funded bailout can be defined, for present purposes, as an
injection of public money into an otherwise insolvent firm that imposes at least
some losses on parties other than the non-public shareholders and creditors of
the firm.' 7 This injection may take the form of equity capital or unsecured debt.
The party that is bailed out is not really the firm, but rather the firm's creditors
and shareholders to the extent they are insulated from the losses they otherwise
would have bome in a liquidation, reorganization, or private-sector
recapitalization. The firm's managers and employees are also beneficiaries of
the bailout to the extent that they otherwise would have lost their jobs or other
income or wealth, including equity they hold in the firm.
Under this definition, the injection of public money into the mortgage
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be treated as a bailout, even though
these government-sponsored entities (GSEs) had always been perceived to
enjoy an implicit government guarantee. As of October 2011, the government
had injected a combined $169 billion into the two GSEs in the form of senior
preferred stock and warrants for approximately eighty percent of their common
stock in order to prevent their insolvency.' Although their common and
preferred shareholders were massively diluted, they were not entirely wiped
out, and their senior and subordinated creditors were entirely insulated against
17. Compare my proposed definition to the one proposed by Kenneth Scott, who states that "a
bailout occurs when some favored claimants on a failed financial firm are given more than what they
would receive in a strict bankruptcy, at the expense of others." Kenneth E. Scott, A Guide to the
Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Dodd-Frank Title It and Proposed Chapter 14, in Thomas H.
Jackson et al., Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquidation Authority and a New
Chapter 14, at 9-10 (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Resolution-Project-Booklet-4-1 .pdf. Professor
Scott's definition is insensitive to whether the costs are bome by taxpayers, the public debt, the
shareholders and creditors of the firm, a deposit insurance fund, or the financial industry (through an ex
post assessment), and to whether the government's exposure, if any, is fully secured. His definition
appears too sweeping because it would seem to count as "bailouts" not only secured lender-of-last-resort
facilities and deposit insurance schemes, but also many ordinary reorganizations under the Bankruptcy
Code. Such reorganizations often allow critical vendor creditors whose flow of inputs, and important
customer creditors whose flow of purchases, are necessary for the continuing operations of a failed
business to receive "more than what they would receive in a strict bankruptcy, at the expense of others,"
in the form of immediate payments made without the consent of other creditors. See DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 225-26 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the availability under Chapter 11
of so-called "critical vendor orders" and other immediate payments to certain unsecured creditors where
such payments are "in the interests of the estate as a whole").
18. See Projections of the Enterprises' Financial Performance, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY 3
(Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22738/GSEProjF.pdf (noting also that total Treasury
assistance may exceed $300 billion by end of 2014); Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis
and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010 BYU L. REV. 421, 449.
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losses.19 Many of their senior managers resigned or were replaced, but most of
their employees were insulated from losing their jobs, incomes, or wealth.2 0
By contrast, the traditional lender-of-last-resort activities of central banks
are not taxpayer-funded bailouts,21 even though they expose central banks to a
22
contingent risk of loss and create a certain amount of increased moral hazard.
As outlined by Walter Bagehot in his classic treatise on banking, the traditional
lender-of-last-resort function of a central bank is to lend freely to solvent-but-
illiquid firms during a financial panic on a fully secured basis and at penalty
rates.23 Lender-of-last-resort facilities thus provide firms with an emergency
source of credit in order to turn assets that have temporarily become illiquid
into cash. Bagehot would not have limited this privilege to banks, but rather
encouraged such emergency lending to all firms that are solvent and have
sufficient collateral. Thus, under Bagehot's conception, both the Federal
Reserve's authority to lend to insured depository institutions through its
discount windoW24 and its authority to lend to all firms under section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act2 would qualify as lender-of-last-resort facilities.
Of course, it requires considerable judgment to distinguish between an
insolvent firm and a fundamentally sound firm whose assets are merely illiquid
during a financial panic. The requirement that any emergency lending be done
on a fully secured basis at penalty rates, however, provides a certain amount of
protection against mistakes and moral hazard. Assuming that the central bank
properly applies a "haircut," or discount, to the collateral value of any assets
accepted as security, the amount of credit that an insolvent firm can incur will
be limited by its unencumbered assets, and the central bank will be insulated
against losses. At the same time, if the penalty rate is stiff enough, the
disincentive to use these facilities should minimize any moral hazard.
19. Joseph Stiglitz, Fannie's and Freddie's Free Lunch, FIN. TIMES (July 4, 2008, 6:23 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6999a06-5994-l ldd-90f8-000077b07658.html.
20. Heidi N. Moore, Winners & Losers of the Fannie & Freddie Bailout, WALL ST. J. DEAL J.
(Sept. 7, 2008, 8:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/07/winners-losers-in-the-fannie-freddie-
bailout.
21. Milton Friedman, for example, considered lender-of-last-resort facilities to be appropriate
governmental functions consistent with free market principles, rather than bailouts. Indeed, Friedman
largely blamed the Great Depression on the Federal Reserve's failure to exercise its lender-of-last-resort
powers aggressively enough. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 407-19. Friedrich von
Hayek also recognized that lender-of-last-resort facilities are necessary in a free market economy whose
core monetary base consists of central bank money, although this recognition led him to the conclusion
that central bank money should be abolished. See F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY-THE
ARGUMENT REFINED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES
105-06 (3d ed. 1990), available at http://mises.org/books/denationalisation.pdf.
22. Moral hazard refers to the phenomenon by which individuals and firms engage in riskier
behavior if someone else, such as an insurance company or the government, bears the cost of that risk in
their stead. See MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 5 (5th ed.
1994).
23. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIFTON OF THE MONEY MARKET 97
(Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1962) (1873).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2006).




In addition, deposit insurance or other similar credit insurance schemes
should not be treated as taxpayer-funded bailouts, even though they insulate
insured depositors or creditors from loss, and therefore increase moral hazard.
The insured parties pay premiums for their insurance, allowing the costs of
such government interventions to be borne by members of the insured
community, rather than by the taxpaying public.
B. Disorderly Liquidations
The term "disorderly liquidation" has nothing to do with the orderliness of
the liquidation proceeding. A liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code is
indisputably orderly. Instead, the term is used as shorthand for value-destroying
liquidations of financial assets at the bottom of the market during a financial
panic, or for value-destroying reorganizations that take so long to consummate
that the firm, like a melting ice cube, has lost most of its value by the time the
reorganization is approved. A more descriptive term might be "fire-sale
liquidations" or "value-destroying reorganizations." Such liquidations and
reorganizations minimize the value of a distressed firm and maximize the
losses borne by its shareholders and creditors. During a financial panic, they
also minimize the perceived value of similar assets throughout the financial
system and maximize the incentives of depositors and other short-term
creditors to stage a "run"-that is, to pull their cash out of the system. 26 This, in
turn, increases the risk of a severe destabilization or collapse of the financial
system.
C. When a Bailout Is the Lesser of Two Evils
A bailout is the lesser of two evils whenever the social costs of a bailout
are less than those of the next best alternative. For example, consider a situation
in which the only alternative to a bailout is the sort of disorderly fire-sale
liquidation that Chairman Bair described.2 7 Assume that a particular SIFI
becomes insolvent during a financial panic. Assume further that the SIFI has $1
trillion in liabilities and a going-concern value, before liabilities, of $950
billion. This gross going-concern value can only be realized if the firm is
immediately recapitalized with $150 billion in return for all of the firm's
common equity, leaving the firm with a net firm value of $100 billion and a
tangible common equity leverage ratio of approximately ten percent. The net
cost of recapitalizing this firm would be $50 billion-the gross cost of $150
26. For an argument that the global financial panic of 2008 was mainly the product of runs on
wholesale secured funding facilities in the form of repurchase agreements, see Gary B. Gorton &
Andrew Metrick, Haircuts (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 09-15, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1447438.
27. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 63-64 (2010) (statement
of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC).
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billion, less the $100 billion value of the new common equity issued to the
taxpayers. Furthermore, even after this recapitalization, the firm will need a
temporary source of secured funding, until it can regain its footing and its
access to general credit markets.
By contrast, if the firm's assets are immediately liquidated in a fire sale at
the bottom of the panic-affected market, the assets may generate as little as
$400 billion in cash. 2 8  Thus, the firm's "going-concern surplus"-the
difference between its gross going-concern value and its liquidation value-is
$550 billion.2 9 Moreover, much of the potential loss represented by this going-
concern surplus is a "deadweight" loss in the social value of the assets, rather
than a "mere" transfer of wealth from the firm's unlucky and potentially
imprudent creditors to the "lucky" and potentially more prudent purchasers of
the assets at the fire-sale prices. 30 Such a dramatically large going-concern
surplus may emerge very suddenly during a financial panic, when the market
experiences extreme uncertainty and excessive pessimism about the value of a
SIFI's assets and its future earnings, and nearly every financial institution-
fearing a cascade of withdrawals and terrified about its own survival-starts
pleading: "Cash, cash, my kingdom for some cash."
28. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd-Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers 28
(Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 401, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-l 895692 (asserting that liquidation value of SIFI during an economic collapse
"is likely to be close to zero").
29. The "archetypal case" of a business with a large going-concern surplus is a railroad. See
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 59. "The assets of a railroad-rights-of-way over narrow strips of land,
hundreds or thousands of miles of iron rails, millions of wooden ties, and assorted bridges across the
country-have relatively little scrap value." Id. at 60. The going-concern value of a railroad's assets in
the hands of railroad experts may therefore be substantially greater than its liquidation value in the hands
of anyone who only values them at their scrap value.
30. According to a substantial body of economics literature, fire sales of illiquid financial
assets during a financial crisis result in prices that are far below the value of the assets at best use. This
deadweight loss occurs because potential buyers who would be able to realize the highest values from
those assets are all cash- and credit-constrained during a crisis, and cannot bid for them at prices equal to
their value at best use. The only actors willing and able to purchase the assets are ones who can only
realize the substantially lower liquidation value of the assets. The resulting misallocation of resources
gives rise to a deadweight loss in social value. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation
Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992) (establishing the
model demonstrating that fire sales of illiquid assets during periods of system-wide financial distress
result in substantial deadweight loss of social value and not merely private losses); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient? 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990) (spotlighting the hidden
social costs of auctioning off assets of distressed firms); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Fire Sales
in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 29 (surveying the economics
literature since the 1992 paper and confirming that fire sales result in social costs). But see Douglas G.
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 127 (1986) (arguing that under
general conditions, liquidation is preferable to corporate reorganization).
31. Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III, act 5, sc. 4, 1. 7 (Barbara A. Mowat & Paul
Werstine eds., Wash. Square Press 2004) (1597) ("A horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse!"). See
Shleifer & Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, supra note 30, at 39-41 (describing the
"cycle of price collapses" during fall of 2008); see also Genesis 47:13-26 (describing desperate
measures undertaken by cash-strapped Egyptians during seven years of famine, who, in return for bread




Under these circumstances, the social cost of a taxpayer-funded bailout
would include the following: the sum of the net cost of recapitalizing the
insolvent institution ($50 billion); the cost of providing it with a temporary
source of secured funding; and the increased moral hazard created by the
bailout. This cost might be offset by any contribution collected from the firm's
bailed-out creditors, or by any proceeds from the eventual sale of the equity
received in exchange for the recapitalization in excess of the equity's initial
$100 billion value. The social cost of the fire-sale liquidation, by contrast,
would be the portion of the going-concern surplus that is a deadweight loss in
the social value of the assets, which is likely to be close to $550 billion, 32 plus
the increased risk of a severe destabilization or collapse of the financial system,
with corresponding immediate and long-term harm to the wider economy and
society.33 This back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that, under many
circumstances, a bailout would be less costly to society than a fire-sale
liquidation of the SIFI. Regardless of their commitment to free-market
principles or to restraining the relative influence of Wall Street, many
policymakers will choose the bailout option because it minimizes net social
costs.
Of course, in a world of perfect information and with no collective action
problems or other transaction costs, 34 the SIFI's creditors would be willing to
reimburse the taxpayers for their bailout and to pay for the temporary secured
funding at penalty rates. However, they would be willing to do so only if their
sole alternative were to forfeit the going-concern surplus and receive their pro-
rata shares of the firm's immediate liquidation value. Alternatively, the
creditors would be willing to have $150 billion of their claims written down
and exchanged for $100 billion of common equity in the firm, eliminating the
need for a taxpayer-funded bailout. In reality, however, the federal government
typically emerges as the only actor with both the capacity and the motivation to
organize a timely intervention, leaving it in the position of negotiating with the
creditors for their contributions in a high-moral-hazard environment.
D. Toward a Credible Alternative to Bailouts
Taxpayer-funded bailouts will remain inevitable during financial panics as
long as their social costs are perceived to be less than the social costs of the
available alternatives. To avoid future bailouts, it is not enough to reduce the
influence of Wall Street or ensure that public officials express a renewed
commitment to free-market principles. Rather, policymakers must develop a
32. See supra note 30.
33. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 115-16 (explaining the consequences of a depression as
including high inflation, increases in the national debt, and political instability); Hall, supra note 13, at 3
(noting that the financial crisis that began in 1929 led to the Great Depression, and that the financial
crisis of 2008 led to the "Great Recession").
34. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
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credible alternative to both taxpayer-funded bailouts and disorderly
liquidations. For an alternative to be credible, both policymakers and the
market must be confident that it will result in lower social costs than either a
bailout or a disorderly liquidation.
II. Proposed Solutions
Several solutions have been proposed to this dilemma. Some focus on
making financial failures less likely or less severe. Such ex ante solutions
include the following: better risk management and supervision,35 more frequent
stress-testing,3 6 more effective early remediation measures, 37 higher capital and
liquidity requirements,38 breaking up the largest banks into constellations of
smaller banks,39 early-trigger contingent capital or bail-in mechanisms, 4 0 and
recovery and resolution plans.4 1 Other solutions focus on reducing the social
costs of resolving SIFIs at the point of nonviability or even afterwards. Such ex
post solutions include a proposed new Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code;42
35. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. Ill-
203, § 165, 124 Stat. 1375, 1423-32 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
36. See, e.g., id. § 165(i), 124 Stat. at 1430-31 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
37. See, e.g., id. § 166, 124 Stat. at 1432 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5366).
38. See, e.g., id. § 165(g), (j), 124 Stat. at 1429, 1431 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365); id. § 171,
124 Stat. at 1431 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371). Collectively, these sections of the Act comprise the so-
called Collins Amendment, introduced by Senator Susan Collins of Maine. See also BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (June 2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf (mandating higher capital and liquidity requirements); BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT (July
2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publbcbs20l.pdf (proposing to impose additional capital
requirements on systemically important financial institutions); Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies,
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive
(Stanford Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 86, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1669704 (arguing that increased capital requirements would substantially
reduce risk of failure with almost no social tradeoff in terms of reducing supply of credit or increasing
its cost).
39. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 121(a)(5), 124 Stat. at 1410 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
533 1(a)(5)); id. § 165(d)(5)(B), 124 Stat. at 1427 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365); JOHNSON & KWAK,
supra note 4, at 208.
40. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 165(c), 124 Stat. at 1425 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory
Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011); see also Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al.,
Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion
Note SDN/11/01, 2011), available at http://www.imf.orglextemal/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdntl01.pdf
(discussing various proposed contingent capital requirements, including those with "high level"-that is,
early-triggers).
41. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1424-25 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365);
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER: RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION PLANS (Aug. 2011), available
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/CP/2011/1l_16.shtml (U.K.); Christine M. Cumming,
First Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance
Dialogue: Early Intervention and Resolution (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2010/cuml01025.html.
42. Jackson et al., supra note 17.
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bail-in at the point of nonviability;4 3 and recapitalizations or bail-in within
resolution,4 4 including use of the FDIC's bank and nonbank resolution
authorities to recapitalize the systemically important operations of a bank or
nonbank SIFI.45
This Part proceeds in two stages. Section II.A reviews the leading
proposals for ex ante solutions and finds that none of these proposals is fail-
safe, that some may be counterproductive or ineffective, and that all involve
trade-offs that could result in excessive social costs. Section II.B then briefly
outlines the leading proposals for ex post solutions. Parts III and IV will
explore in detail two of the mechanisms that underlie these proposed ex post
solutions-a revamped Bankruptcy Code and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act's orderly liquidation authority.
Of course, there may be no single best solution for all SIFIs under all
circumstances. Rather, every firm faces a range of alternative or
complementary solutions appropriate to the structure of the firm, the cross-
border component of its operations, the substance of the laws governing the
insolvency of its various parts, and a variety of other factors. In the wake of the
2008 crisis, many SIFIs have been required to identify the best solutions for
themselves under various scenarios and to prepare and maintain living wills-
that is, contingency plans designed to assist in avoiding or recovering from a
financial disaster, or if those efforts fail, to be resolved in the least-costly
46
way.
A. Ex Ante Solutions
The ex ante solutions that focus on reducing the likelihood and severity of
failure are not cost-free. They all involve tradeoffs, including the supply and
43. See, e.g., CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK BAIL-INS (2011), available
at http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2011/05/legalaspects-ofbankbail-
ins.hml; Thomas Huertas, Banking Sector Dir., Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), Speech at The Euro and the
Financial Crisis Conference: The Road to Better Resolution: From Bail-out to Bail-in (Sept. 6, 2010),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/th_6sepl0.pdf
44. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATrRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUrION REGIMES FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 9 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r11 1104cc.pdf.
45. Comment Letter from Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n. (SIFMA) & Clearing House Ass'n,
to Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (FDIC) on FDIC's Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under Title II of
the Dodd-Frank Act (May 23, 2011) [hereinafter "SIFMA & Clearing House Comment Letter"],
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/201 1/11cl 6Ad73.PDF.
46. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
121(a), 124 Stat. 1375, 1410 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a)); id. § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1426-27
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP & MCKINSEY & CO., CREDIBLE LIVING
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cost of credit in the wider economy. As a result, they may be too socially costly
or politically unpopular to succeed.47
To take one extreme example, the risk of taxpayer-funded bailouts could
be virtually eliminated by banning maturity transformation-the process by
which financial institutions fund themselves with demand deposits or other
short-term borrowings and use these funds to make long-term loans or invest in
other illiquid assets.48 It is this core activity that makes financial institutions
vulnerable to runs and correlated waves of failure. 49 By banning maturity
transformation, policymakers could virtually eliminate bank failures and thus
end taxpayer-funded bailouts. Of course, the problem with this "solution" is
that maturity transformation is the mechanism that creates most of the money
and credit in a modem economy.50 Without it, our economy would screech to a
halt.
Similar tradeoffs arise when we try to eliminate the risk of taxpayer-
funded bailouts through other ex ante solutions. For example, SIFIs would
almost certainly be more resilient to failure during a financial panic if they
were subject to higher core capital requirements and required to have more
liquid balance sheets. But if they were, the wider economy would have access
to less credit, and at a higher price. Alternatively, SIFIs could be required to
contribute to a credit insurance program, similar to the FDIC's program for
insured banks; this bank tax would increase the cost of creating money and
supplying credit, though, leaving the financial system with less of both. More
troublesome, the fund created by such a tax could be so large that it might
create an irresistible temptation for policymakers to divert it to other social uses
47. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 821 (arguing that most ex ante solutions are insufficient due
to the "regulatory sine curve," which leads to deregulation when memories of a financial crisis fade and
the public becomes convinced that the cost of regulation exceeds the benefits).
48. See Ricks, supra note 14, at 98.
49. See Sandra C. Krieger, Executive Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
the Global Association of Risk Professionals 12th Annual Risk Management Convention: Reducing the
Systemic Risk in Shadow Maturity Transformation (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2011/kril10308.html (explaining the role of maturity
transformation in the tendency of "runs [to] spread from unhealthy to healthy institutions," especially
when lender-of-last-resort facilities are unavailable); see also FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 2-3
(2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook (demonstrating the correlated
nature of U.S. bank failures, with nearly 10,000 failures during the Great Depression and 3000 during
the savings-and-loan crisis, and with almost no significant failures during the intervening fifty years);
GORTON, supra note 14, at 3 (illustrating the correlated waves of U.S. bank failures during the
Depression, the savings-and-loan crisis, and the global financial panic of 2008); Douglas & Guynn,
supra note 11, at 317 (same); Historical Statistics on Banking, FDIC,
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (select "Geographic Area: United States and
Other Areas," "Effective Date(s): Between 1934 and 2011," and "Type of Report: Detail," and follow
"Produce Report" button) (last visited Dec. 5, 2011) (listing all FDIC bank interventions since 1934, by
year, and showing the same pattern of intermittent waves of correlated failures).
50. See KEARL, supra note 15, at 422-25 (explaining the "money multiplier" effect, by which





during the long periods between waves of bank failures, which would make it
unavailable when needed during a financial crisis.
Banks could also be made less vulnerable to failure if they were limited in
their ability to engage in high-risk activities. The most extreme version of this
proposal is the utility or narrow bank-a bank that is required to invest all of its
funds in very safe, highly liquid instruments, such as U.S. government
securities. Such a bank would no longer be engaged in maturity
transformation, though, which would bring us back to the first scenario
described above. Less radically, regulators might prohibit (or use capital
requirements to discourage) activities or investments in assets that are
perceived to involve excessively high "tail" risk,52 or "black swans."53 The
Glass-Steagall Act,54 the Volcker Rule,55 and the proposed ring-fencing of
retail banks in the United Kingdom, 56 all impose activity or investment
restrictions that have been justified by this premise, even though some of the
activities or investments they restrict may in fact be less risky and just as
socially useful as traditional lending. Unless similar restrictions are imposed
throughout the financial system, the role of creating money and credit would
simply shift from regulated banks to either the largely unregulated shadow
banking system or offshore. In the end, the bailout risk might be as large in the
shadow and foreign banking systems as it had been in the regulated domestic
banking system. The idea that we can create a divided financial system and
eliminate the bailout risk in the regulated banking system without giving rise to
similar bailout pressures in the shadow or foreign banking systems is an
illusion.
Finally, consider a solution in which the largest banks are broken up into
constellations of smaller banks. As long as the smaller banks engage in
maturity transformation and invest in assets that are correlated with each other,
their risks of failure during a financial panic will remain similarly correlated.
51. See, e.g., Mervyn King, Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech to Scottish Business
Organizations 58-59 (Oct. 20, 2009),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf; John Kay, Narrow
Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation 4-5 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.johnkay.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/JK-Narrow-Banking.pdf.
52. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: How HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 134-53, 162-81 (2010).
53. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2007).
54. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 20, 48 Stat. 162, 188-89 (prohibiting
FDIC-insured banks from affiliating with investment banks engaged principally in underwriting and
dealing in corporate securities), repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113
Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
55. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
619, 124 Stat. 1375, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) (prohibiting banking entities from
engaging in proprietary trading and making certain investments or having certain relationships with
hedge funds or private equity funds).
56. INDEP. COMM'N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS
76-101 (2011), available at http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/htedn/Interim-Report-1 1041 1.pdf.
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Unless each constellation of banks faces risks that are less correlated than those
faced by the original bank, or manages these risks more effectively, each
constellation could fail in a correlated wave57-with the same consequences to
the financial system as the failure of the original bank. Furthermore, the social
costs of such a "solution" would be significant. Smaller banks are likely to be
less diversified and have fewer resources to devote to effective risk
management. They are not subject to the Dodd-Frank Act's enhanced
prudential standards, which are reserved for large and systemically important
58institutions. They may also be less competitive internationally, lacking the
balance sheets necessary to compete with larger foreign banks in satisfying the
borrowing needs of large U.S. corporations. Indeed, the break-up solution
would resemble a return to the sort of "unit" banking that was one of the
alleged causes of bank failures during the Great Depression,5 9 which led
policymakers to promote the modem system of branch banking and
consolidated banks.o It appears that the physicians of the financial system
57. Such waves of failure are copiously attested in the historical record. Nearly 10,000 small
and medium-sized banks and thrifts failed in a correlated wave between 1930 and 1933, see GORTON,
supra note 14, at 14, contributing to the turmoil of the Great Depression. Another wave in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, associated with the savings-and-loan crisis, brought down nearly 3000 small and
medium-sized banks and thrifts. See Douglas & Guynn, supra note 11, at 317. Finally, virtually all of
the banks and thrifts that have failed during the most recent financial crisis or found themselves unable
to repay their obligations under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) have been small and
medium-sized institutions. See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
EXITING TARP: REPAYMENTS BY THE LARGEST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Sept. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2011/Exiting TARPRepayments bythe Largest FinancialInsti
tutions.pdf; Kevin Wack, For Many Small Banks, TARP Becomes Trap, AM. BANKER (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_190/tarp-community-banks-small-business-lending-fund-
1042686-1.html?zkPrintable-true; Failed Bank List, FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
58. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a), 124 Stat. at 1423-24 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)).
59. See Charles W. Calomiris, The Political Lessons of Depression-Era Banking Reform, 26
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 540, 542 (2010); see also 76 CONG. REC. 1405 (1933) (remarks of Sen.
Carter Glass) ("But when I tell you of the nearly 11,000 banks that have failed in recent years, 80 per
cent of them were banks whose capitalization did not exceed $25,000, you may have some conception of
the menace they are to sound banking and the curse to their depositors."); 75 CONG. REC. 9892, 9896-97
(1932) (remarks of Sen. Carter Glass) ("It is, therefore, obvious that the problem is largely one of small
rural bank failures.... [T]here are thousands of country banks that have failed ... because those banks
are so inadequately supplied with capital that they can not afford to employ expert bank managers and
skillful bank officials. . . . [W]e have in this country hundreds of 1-crop banks, so to speak. The diversity
of their business is inappreciable; and if that one crop fails, the bank fails.... Two fundamental causes
are at the root of the small bank failures-lack of diversity and necessarily lack of earning power. Most
of the small banks are what may be termed, as I have stated, 1-crop or I-enterprise banks.").
60. See Mark Carlson & Kris James Mitchener, Branch Banking, Bank Competition, and
Financial Stability (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2005-20, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=725021; see also 76 CONG. REC. 1413 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Jesse H.
Metcalf) ("Branch banking means diversification, and diversification means decrease in failures as the
result of strictly local occurrences"); 75 CONG. REC. 9892, 9896 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Carter Glass)
(predicting that weaknesses that caused country banks to fail "would not apply to larger banks having
branches in a community where the unit bank is so weak"). This view was not unanimous. See, e.g., 75
CONG. REC. 10,056 (1932) (remarks of Sen. John J. Blaine) ("[The argument in favor of branch
banking] implies that bigness and volume mean strength. The probabilities are that bigness and volume
mean weakness instead of strength, at least, there is some persuasive evidence that bigness and volume
do not mean strength in banking.").
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prescribe consolidation when banks are small and break-ups when banks are
large, even though the fundamental problems (and solutions) are largely
independent of size.
B. Ex Post Solutions
Three principal ex post solutions have been proposed in recent years. The
first proposal recognizes that the current Bankruptcy Code is not a credible
alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts and seeks to resolve this problem by
introducing into the Code a new Chapter 14 designed specifically for
liquidating or reorganizing SIFIs.61 The second proposal features so-called
"bail-in at the point of nonviability." 62 This approach would recapitalize a
struggling SIFI without receivership or other insolvency proceedings by
converting enough of the claims against the SIFI into common equity, in
accordance with the priorities of such claims, at some defined point of
nonviability. The third proposal involves a so-called "recapitalization within
resolution,"6 which is similar to a bail-in at the point of nonviability, except
that it is effected only after an institution is closed and placed into a resolution
or insolvency proceeding. This technique could be used, for example, by the
FDIC, exercising its new orderly liquidation authority under Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act in combination with its bank resolution powers under the
Federal Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act,64 to recapitalize the systemically
important and other viable operations of a bank or nonbank SIFI within the
resolution proceeding. The mechanisms underlying these three proposed
solutions are discussed in greater depth in the Parts that follow.
III. The Problem with Bankruptcy
A. The Strength of the Bankruptcy System in Ordinary Times
For all the talk about the Bankruptcy Code's weaknesses in resolving a
global SIFI like Lehman Brothers during a financial crisis,65 the Bankruptcy
Code has some important advantages in reorganizing and liquidating most
61. See Jackson et al., supra note 17.
62. See CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, supra note 43.
63. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 44; SIFMA & Clearing House Comment Letter, supra
note 45.
64. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
tit. II, 124 Stat. 1375, 1442-1520 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-94); Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, §§ 11, 13, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1823 (2006).
65. See, e.g., FDIC, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q. 31 (2011), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011_vol5_2/Article2.pdf But see DAVID SKEEL, THE
NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
CONSEQUENCES 19-40 (2011) (arguing that the failure of Lehman Brothers did not trigger the financial
crisis and that the firm's resolution under the Bankruptcy Code worked quite well).
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nonbank financial institutions most of the time.66 As a result, the Bankruptcy
Code continues to apply unless the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation
authority (OLA) is invoked.
Foremost among the Bankruptcy Code's advantages is what it offers in
terms of transparency and due process safeguards for creditors and other
stakeholders. All creditors and other stakeholders have substantial input into
structuring a liquidation or reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code, thus
ensuring that the value of the failed company is allocated in a fair manner for
the benefit of the creditors and other stakeholders as a group. The equal-
treatment and absolute-priority rules under the Bankruptcy Code68 are generally
more protective of pre-insolvency property rights and interests than their
counterparts under the OLA or the FDIC's bank resolution authority,6 9 which
66. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STUDY ON THE RESOLUTION OF
FINANCIAL COMPANIES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 5-6 (2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/bankruptcy-financial-study-201107.pdf;




67. See Douglas & Guynn, supra note 11, at 317. Activating the OLA requires the
concurrence of the so-called "triple keys"-the Secretary of the Treasury, acting in consultation with the
President; two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and two-thirds of the
FDIC Board. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
203(a), 124 Stat. 1375, 1450-51 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)). In the case of a broker or
dealer, or a financial company whose largest U.S. subsidiary is a broker-dealer, the consent of two thirds
of the Securities and Exchange Commission is required in lieu of the FDIC. Id. In the case of an
insurance company, or a financial company whose largest U.S. subsidiary is an insurance company, the
consent of the Director of the Federal Insurance Office is required instead of the FDIC. Id.
In order to activate the OLA, the three entities must agree that a particular nonbank financial institution
has failed or is in danger of failing; that resolving it under the Bankruptcy Code would have serious
adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States; and that invoking the OLA would avoid or
mitigate those effects. Id. § 203(b), 124 Stat. at 1451 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)). Although this
determination could theoretically be invoked for any nonbank financial institution at any time, these
standards are unlikely to be met except with respect to nonbank SIFIs under the most destabilizing
financial conditions.
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2006) (requiring that all substantially similar claims and interests
be included within same class); id. § II 23(a)(4) (requiring that bankruptcy plan provide same treatment
for each claim or interest in same class); id. § 1129 (requiring that a court confirm a bankruptcy plan
only if it complies with the aforementioned provisions). Although these rules are more protective than
their counterparts under the OLA, they are not as "absolute" as the common terminology would imply.
Under the "cramdown" power, a plan of reorganization can be imposed on a class of impaired claims
and interests that did not consent to the plan as long as at least one impaired class has accepted the plan
and the plan does not "discriminate unfairly" against, and is "fair and equitable" with respect to, the
non-consenting class. Id. § 1 129(b)(1). If the plan meets these standards, under the "best interests of
creditors" rule, it can also be imposed on any non-consenting individual holder of a claim or interest as
long as the holder will receive or retain a value that is not less than the amount that such holder would
receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7. Id. § I 129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
69. See Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(7)(B), 124 Stat. at 1468 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390)
(entitling creditors to receive not less than the amount they would have received in Chapter 7
liquidation); id. § 210(b)(4), 124 Stat. at 1476-77 (requiring that similarly situated claimants be treated
in similar manner unless certain conditions are satisfied, including that all claimants receive not less than
they would have received in Chapter 7 liquidation); id. § 210(d)(2), 124 Stat, at 1494 (establishing
maximum entitlement of any claimant as claimant's share in Chapter 7 liquidation); id § 210(h)(4), 124
Stat. at 1499 (requiring FDIC, in exercising power to transfer assets and liabilities to bridge company, to
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are more akin to the "best interests of creditors" rule under the current
Bankruptcy Code and those under the law of equitable receiverships or the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.70
The Bankruptcy Code also allows creditors to assess in advance with
greater certainty how they will be treated in a resolution proceeding. The
bankruptcy process is more rule-based than its alternatives and has produced an
extensive body of case law, commentary, and other guidelines. In contrast, the
FDIC has extremely broad discretion to structure any resolution under the
OLA, with only a limited body of regulations and other legal guidance to
constrain its discretion. While the FDIC is required to issue regulations to
provide better legal guidance about the OLA than it has historically provided
about bank resolutions, it has only had time to clarify a few issues to date. As
two former government officials wrote more than twenty years ago regarding
the bank resolution process:
This is a confusing area. The challenge arises less because of the complexity of the rules than
because of their ambiguity and obscurity. The Bankruptcy Code generally constitutes the
starting point for rules governing the failure of companies in the United States. It contains a
detailed set of rules that fill three volumes of U.S. Code Annotated, volumes of West's
Bankruptcy Reporter, and over four linear feet of Collier's [on Bankruptcy]. But the statutes
governing conservatorships and receiverships of federally insured banks and thrifts fill, at
most, about 111 pages of the U.S. Code Annotated. 71
B. The Weakness of the Bankruptcy Code During a Panic
The weaknesses of the Bankruptcy Code become apparent, however,
when it is the only available option for resolving a global SIFI during a
financial panic.7 2 First, bankruptcy is a slow and deliberate process that is not
designed for preserving systemically important operations critical to the
treat similarly situated creditors in similar manner unless certain conditions are satisfied); see also 12
U.S.C. § 5390 (Supp. 2010) (codifying Dodd-Frank Act § 210); id. § 1821(i)(2) (setting FDIC's
maximum liability to any creditor equal to creditor's share in liquidation); Douglas & Guynn, supra note
11, at 346-47 (discussing maximum and minimum recovery rights).
70. See 11 U.S.C § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006) (describing the "best interests of creditors" rule);
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 62-66 (describing the procedures for railroad reorganizations under the law of
equitable receivership and under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the "best interests of creditors" rule
under the current Bankruptcy Code); see also Fleischmann & Devine, Inc. v. Saul Wolfson Dry Goods
Co., 299 F. 15, 18 (5th Cir. 1924) (noting that, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the offered plan must
be "for the best interests of the creditors" and that a plan is "manifestly not for the best interests of the
creditors if it would pay them considerably less than they might reasonably expect to realize in the
administration of the assets in due course").
71. John L. Douglas et al., Introduction to COUNSELING CREDITORS OF BANKS AND THRIFTS:
DEALING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC, PLI ORDER NO. A4-4323, at 10 (John L. Douglas et al. eds., 1991).
72. See, e.g., Rodgin Cohen & Morris Goldstein, The Case for an Orderly Resolution Regime
for Systemically-Important Financial Institutions (Briefing Paper No. 13, The Pew Charitable Trusts
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functioning of the economy as a whole. This same deliberateness makes
bankruptcy a poor fit for preserving or maximizing the value of institutions
whose assets have a liquidation value that rapidly approaches zero during a
financial panic, and whose going-concern value may melt away by the time the
reorganization process is complete.73 Although bankruptcy's due process
safeguards are an important feature, they need to be balanced against other
considerations during a financial crisis when justice delayed can be justice
denied, and a failure to act promptly can result in a severe destabilization or
collapse of the financial system.
Second, bankruptcy lacks certain tools that are necessary during a
financial panic to preserve the systemically important and other viable
operations of a global SIFI and to prevent severe harm to the financial system.
For example, it does not provide for the creation of bridge entities or authorize
the transfer of certain critical operations to a bridge without the consent of
counterparties or a court, as may be required during a fast-developing financial
panic.7 4 Nor do its equal-treatment and absolute-priority rules, as beneficial as
they are in quieter times, provide much flexibility in a crisis. Although
bankruptcy judges routinely permit debtors to pay critical vendor creditors and
important customer creditors with little or no notice to other creditors in order
to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate, they lack the power to do so for
reasons beyond the impact on the estate. Bankruptcy judges are therefore
barred from favoring short-term creditors, who are likely to stage a run at the
expense of long-term creditors who cannot run, unless that would maximize the
value of the estate-even if doing so would prevent further harm to the
financial system while still leaving the disfavored creditors with more than they
would have received in a liquidation. Nor does bankruptcy provide access to
any public lender-of-last-resort funding facility if debtor-in-possession (DIP)
financing is not available from the private sector. Since no private sector bank
is likely to be healthy or confident enough to provide a sufficient amount of
emergency funding during a panic, such an emergency source of short-term
government funding is as crucial for the continuing operations of a financial
institution as raw materials are for the continuing operations of a manufacturing
business.75
73. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 28, at 33. Judge Peck, in explaining the exigencies
driving his approval of the sale of Lehman Brothers to Barclay's Capital under section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code, emphasized this potential for value destruction. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP), 2008 WL 4902202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19,2008).
74. While transfers are possible under section 363, they typically cannot be made without
counterparty consent and court approval, which can take substantial time to obtain.
75. See Thomas F. Huertas, Barriers to Resolution 1 (Feb. 22, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/events/conferences/2011/DBWorkshop 14Mar2l1/ll-
ThomasHuertas.pdf ("The very essence of banking is the ability to make commitments to pay-
depositors at maturity, sellers of securities due to settle, borrowers who wish to draw on lending
commitments, derivative counterparties who contracted with the [financial institution] for protection
from interest rate, exchange rate or credit risks. Putting a stay on payments to creditors is equivalent to




Third, bankruptcy has certain features that can reduce and potentially
minimize the value of a global SIFI during a financial panic. For example, the
automatic stay provision 76 would force such a firm into liquidation unless it
were lifted with respect to short-term creditors, because a moratorium on
paying depositors and other short-term creditors is effectively a moratorium on
the firm's core operations.7 7 In contrast, the unqualified exemption from the
automatic stay for financial contracts,78 and the failure to suspend close-out
rights (even if the contracts are transferred within one business day to a
creditworthy third party or bridge entity), can result in value-destroying close-
outs during a financial panic.79 Moreover, the Code's failure to suspend cross-
defaults at affiliates based on the insolvency of a parent or other affiliate-
which is provided for in the OLA 80-can destabilize and reduce the value of an
entire family of otherwise solvent financial companies.
Fourth, the Bankruptcy Code does not require taking into consideration
the public's confidence in the financial system or the effects of a bankruptcy on
systemic risk. In addition, bankruptcy judges have no experience or special
expertise in preserving or restoring public confidence or minimizing systemic
risk. Financial regulators, who have such experience and expertise, have neither
the power to trigger a bankruptcy proceeding nor any significant role to play
once such a proceeding begins.
Finally, the Bankruptcy Code does not include the tools necessary to
conduct or facilitate a cross-border resolution of a global SIFI. Chapter 15 of
the Code implements the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,82 but that
chapter reflects the same slow and deliberate judicial process as the rest of the
Bankruptcy Code. It is not designed for a global SIFI that can lose value
rapidly or threaten the national or global financial system. All of the
disadvantages it has in resolving SIFIs in general are magnified when applied
to global SIFIs with branches, subsidiaries, assets, liabilities, and contracts,
outside the United States. Even if all of the impediments to a cross-border
[financial institutions] cannot readily operate in bankruptcy. So bankruptcy for a [financial institution] is
tantamount to liquidation.").
76. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
77. See Huertas, supra note 75.
78. There is an unqualified safe harbor from the automatic stay for certain derivative contracts
known as "protected contracts" or "qualified financial contracts." II U.S.C. §§ 362, 555, 556, 559, 560,
561 (2006); cf 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8) (2006) (providing a similar safe harbor for the close-out of
qualified financial contracts with a bank in an FDIC receivership); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(c)(8), 124 Stat. 1375, 1481-89 (2010) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)) (providing qualified financial contract provisions).
79. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 1-707, BANKRUPTCY: COMPLEX
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION POSE CHALLENGES 29 (July 2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl 1707.pdf.
80. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(16), 124 Stat. at 1461 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(16)).
81. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2006).
82. UNITED NATIONS COMM. ON INT'L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY (1997), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf.
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resolution could be identified, judges would lack the capacity to address those
impediments effectively, such as by reviewing and evaluating living wills,
seeking international law reform to empower host countries to facilitate cross-
border resolutions by home-country authorities, or entering into bilateral or
multilateral cooperation and coordination agreements with foreign bankruptcy
courts or resolution agencies.
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Proposed Chapter 14
Of course, the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to address most of
these weaknesses. Indeed, a working group at Stanford University's Hoover
Institution has proposed just that-a new Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code
designed specifically for financial institutions with $100 billion or more in
assets.83 The proposed new Chapter 14 would attempt to address the
weaknesses of the existing Bankruptcy Code in several ways. Perhaps most
strikingly, it would grant an institution's primary regulator standing to be heard
as a party or to raise motions relevant to its regulations in a Chapter 14
proceeding.84 The regulator would be empowered to do the following: to
commence an involuntary case against the institution (including on the basis of
mark-to-market balance sheet insolvency or unreasonably small capital);85 to
file motions, in conjunction with the DIP or any trustee, for the use, sale, or
lease of property of the estate under section 363, subject to court review;8 and
to file a plan of reorganization for the debtor at any time after the order for
relief 87 The chapter would also allow DIP financing, whether provided by the
government or the private sector, to be used to make partial or complete
payouts to certain liquidity-sensitive creditors in advance of final distribution,
once again subject to court approval.88 Finally, the new chapter would attempt
to reduce the destruction of value in the form of close-out of financial contracts
by making certain amendments to the safe harbor for financial contracts.89
83. For the latest version of this proposal, see Jackson et al., supra note 17, at 2-3 to -4. The
authors define the scope of Chapter 14 to include domestic and foreign insurance companies,
stockbrokers, and commodity brokers, but not insured depository institutions. Id. at 2-7 to -9.
It is not clear whether its authors view this proposal solely as a supplement to the OLA and the FDIC's
bank resolution authority, or whether they are advocating it as a superior replacement for the OLA.
Compare id. at i ("The purpose of this short collection of papers is to demonstrate why the 'orderly
liquidation authority' . . . should be supplemented with a new and more predictable bankruptcy process
designed specifically for large financial institutions." (emphasis added)) with id. at ii (referring to the
OLA-and implicitly the bank resolution provisions on which it is modeled-as a "discretionary bailout
option" that is vulnerable to constitutional challenge on due process grounds, and to the proposed
Chapter 14 as "a credible alternative to [such] a bailout").
84. Id. at 2-11 to -12.
85. Id. at 2-9to-ll.
86. Id. at 2-12 to -13.
87. Id. at 2-16 to -17.
88. See id. at 2-13 to -16.
89. These proposed amendments are exceedingly complex and will be difficult for the market




The Hoover Institution proposal would also address some of the perceived
cultural and constitutional shortcomings of traditional bankruptcy proceedings.
It would address the lack of experience and expertise of bankruptcy judges, as
well as the limits on their political independence, by requiring Chapter 14 cases
to be adjudicated by a panel of Article III district judges in the Second and D.C.
Circuits. 90
This proposed new Chapter 14 could be a useful supplement to the OLA
and the bank resolution provisions, but as currently proposed, it falls
considerably short of being a credible alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts.
First, even the failure of a financial institution with less than $100 billion in
assets could destabilize the financial system if the market believed its failure
signaled widespread vulnerability, if other financial institutions were dependent
on any of its operations, such as payment or settlement system, or if other
institutions had substantial credit or liquidity exposures to the firm. Banks and
other financial institutions have historically failed in correlated bunches or
waves,91 but Chapter 14 would not apply to the simultaneous failure of multiple
medium-sized financial institutions that may collectively have assets far in
excess of $100 billion.
Second, although Chapter 14 would give financial regulators a greater role
in the SIFI bankruptcy process, it does not expand the goals of the Bankruptcy
Code to consider public confidence or systemic risk. Furthermore, it does not
give either the regulators or the panel of pre-selected Article m judges any
additional power to balance these holistic goals against the existing goals of
bankruptcy. In particular, it fails to provide any of the essential tools necessary
to preserve the systemically important operations of a global SIFI, such as the
powers to create bridge entities, transfer assets and liabilities to a bridge
without counterparty consent, depart from the equal treatment and absolute
priority rules when necessary to prevent a systemic meltdown (subject to a
minimum recovery right tied to liquidation value), or provide government
emergency funding.
Third, although Chapter 14 would provide authority for making very
conservatively-estimated payouts to liquidity-sensitive creditors near the
beginning of a case despite the automatic stay, that power is likely to be too
slow and limited to stem the cascade of demands for cash withdrawals. These
withdrawals could be induced by the fear that an automatic stay could be
imposed on other institutions throughout the system. Such a cascade of
withdrawal demands-a bank run-could spiral out of control and lead to a
severe destabilization or collapse of the financial system. At the same time, the
proposed amendments to the safe harbor for financial contracts are too complex
to be workable. They could therefore do substantially more harm than good in
90. Id. at 2-5 to -7. These Article III judges would be authorized to appoint special masters
from a pre-designated panel of masters to hear and administer the cases. Id.
91. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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furthering the goals of maximizing the value of a derivatives book for the
benefit of the creditors or minimizing the impact of a value-destroying close-
out on the financial system or the economy.
Fourth, there is no reason to believe that a panel of pre-selected Article III
judges or special masters is likely to have any more experience or expertise
with financial institution failures than the average bankruptcy judge. Indeed,
bankruptcy judges have more specialized experience with insolvencies than
Article III judges, who are generalists by nature. Although a pre-selected panel
of judges and masters may be more competent than the average bankruptcy
judge, it would not necessarily have more expertise than a pre-selected panel of
bankruptcy judges, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the Secretary of the
Treasury, or the Security Investors Protection Corporation. 9 2 Indeed, such a
panel of Article III judges and special masters would suffer from the same
fundamental weakness that any resolution authority has with respect to
financial institution failures: because financial institutions tend to fail in waves,
with decades between each wave, whatever expertise and human capital a panel
builds during one wave is likely to be lost by the time the next wave hits.
Furthermore, the proposed chapter does little to address the generally glacial
pace of the judicial bankruptcy process.
Fifth, although Chapter 14 would apply to insurance companies,
stockbrokers and commodity brokers, it would continue to exclude insured
depository institutions. This is a serious and possibly fatal limitation, since the
vast majority of assets in many global SIFIs are attributable to bank affiliates. 93
Having two entirely different processes for the resolution of the bank and
nonbank components of a SIFI group will create impediments to the effective
resolution of the group, increasing the risk that such a process will continue to
impose greater social costs than a taxpayer-funded bailout. Moreover, if the due
process protections and other advantages of proposed Chapter 14 are superior
to the OLA, it is not clear why they are not superior to the bank resolution
provisions in the FDI Act, which served as the model for the OLA.
Finally, the proposed Chapter 14 does not include any new tools for
contingency planning, such as the preparation of recovery and resolution plans,
or for conducting a cross-border resolution of a global SIFI. Indeed, it is
difficult to envision a judicial process engaging in contingency planning or
having the speed and flexibility necessary to carry out an effective value-
92. The Security Investors Protection Corporation, which is a quasi-government agency, is
generally empowered to carry out the liquidation of the securities brokers and dealers it insures. See
Security Investors Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111(2006).
93. For example, between 65-90% of the assets of the four largest U.S. bank holding
companies are attributable to their bank subsidiaries. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SIMPLIFIED
BALANCE SHEETS FOR LARGE BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTION HOLDING COMPANIES 4-5,7,9, 11-
12, 14, 16 (May 2011), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/Large.Fin.Inst.Balance.Sheets.pdf (presenting simplified
balance sheets of Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Co.,




maximizing and systemic-risk minimizing resolution of a global SIFI during a
financial panic.
In short, while the proposed Chapter 14 could be a useful supplement to
the OLA and the bank resolution provisions, as currently proposed it would not
be a credible alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts. If this chapter were the
only option, taxpayer-funded bailouts would remain inevitable because the
social costs of bailing out global SIFIs during a panic would remain
significantly lower than those of reorganizations under the proposed Chapter
14.
IV. The FDIC's Resolution Powers as a Credible Alternative
The new orderly liquidation authority included in the Dodd-Frank Act94
has been described as an important new tool in the regulatory toolkit.95 It is
modeled on the bank receivership provisions in the FDI Act 9 6 but has been
harmonized with the Bankruptcy Code to make it less disruptive for the
creditors of financial companies that would otherwise be liquidated or
reorganized under the Bankruptcy Code.9 7 The FDIC has promised that this
new tool, combined with the old tool of bank resolution, will end the TSTF
problem and make taxpayer-funded bailouts a thing of the past.98
In early 2011, the FDIC released a report describing how it could have
used the OLA to resolve Lehman Brothers in a more orderly fashion than in the
way in which it was resolved under the Bankruptcy Code.99 Before this report
was released, the FDIC's public statements regarding the resolution of nonbank
SIFIs had focused mainly on how it would use the OLA to minimize moral
hazard and maintain market discipline by ensuring that shareholders and
creditors of nonbank SIFIs would bear all of the losses in the event of failure. 00
These early statements failed to distinguish the OLA from a fire-sale
liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code; some therefore questioned whether the
94. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
95. See Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & James B. Thomson, An End to Too Big To Let Fail? The
Dodd-Frank Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2011/2011-01.cfn.
96. These are contained mainly in sections 11 and 13 of the FDI Act, which are codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1823 (2006).
97. For a comprehensive discussion of the FDIC's resolution powers under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act and title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Douglas & Guynn, supra note 11.
98. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Report Examines How an Orderly Resolution of Lehman
Brothers Could Have Been Structured Under the Dodd-Frank Act (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/prll076.html.
99. See FDIC, supra note 65.
100. See e.g., FDIC, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly
Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,175-76 (Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 380); Sheila C. Bair,
Chairman, FDIC, Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation on Systemically Important Institutions and the Issue of "Too Big To Fail" (Sept. 2, 2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spsep02l0.html.
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statutory conditions for invoking the OLA would ever be satisfied,'o' and thus
whether the OLA could provide a credible alternative to a taxpayer-funded
bailout. In its Lehman report, however, the FDIC clarified how the OLA could
be used to provide liquidity or even loss-sharing support to the critical parts of
a SIFI's business, while imposing all losses on a firm's pre-existing
shareholders and creditors, with the goal of maximizing the firm's value,
minimizing its losses, and preserving or restoring financial stability during a
crisis.102
As important as the FDIC's new powers are, though, even more important
is the FDIC's ability to combine its old and new resolution powers to resolve a
global SIF with both bank and nonbank operations. Banking operations are
typically the largest components of the financial groups that are expected to be
designated as global SIFIs. 10 3 As a result, the credibility of any proposed
alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts depends on the FDIC's ability and
willingness to use its combined powers, in coordination with other U.S. and
non-U.S. resolution agencies, to resolve all of the components of a global SIFI.
The remainder of this Part summarizes the FDIC's combined resolution
authority in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act and discusses one particularly
noteworthy way in which this authority might be used. The Part then sets out
some considerations that should guide the agency in the use of its newfound
powers, including the importance of prudence, international cooperation, and
respect for traditional concepts of due process.
A. The FDIC's Combined Resolution Authority
The FDIC's resolution powers give it enormous discretion to structure a
liquidation, reorganization, or recapitalization, of a bank or nonbank SIFI.
Upon appointment as conservator or receiver of an institution, the FDIC
immediately succeeds by law to all of the rights and powers of the institution's
shareholders, directors, and managers.' 04 Unlike the Bankruptcy Code, the FDI
Act imposes no general automatic stay on an institution's payment obligations
101. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n to FDIC on FDIC's
Interim Final Rule Under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, at A-I to -2 (Feb. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/20l1/llc02Orderly.PDF. The OLA may not be invoked
unless the authorizing entities conclude that its use would mitigate the serious adverse effects on the
financial stability of the United States that would result from a non-OLA proceeding. See id. at A-2;
supra note 67.
102. See FDIC, supra note 65.
103. See HUW VAN STEENIS Er AL., MORGAN STANLEY, GLOBAL BANKS: WHAT ECONOMIC
IMPACT COULD THE G-SIFI SURCHARGE HAVE? (June 19, 2011) (on file with author). Such global SIFIs
typically operate through global branch, subsidiary, or other networks located in many countries. See
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 112 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR201 I.pdf
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)-(D) (2006); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer





or a creditor's exercise of any contractual rights aside from termination rights
based on the appointment of a conservator or receiver or the insolvency of the
institution. 05 Even the limited prohibition on enforcing such close-out rights
does not apply to qualified financial contracts (QFCs), although the close-out
rights in these contracts are subject to a temporary stay of one business day.' 06
In place of an automatic stay, however, the FDIC has the power to take a
broad range of actions to maximize the value of the institution and protect the
larger financial system, without seeking consent from creditors, counterparties,
or courts. The FDIC is not obliged to seek input from any creditors and is
subject to judicial review only to scrutinize the validity and size of any denied
claims after the administrative claims process has been completed."o0
The FDIC's powers to resolve a bank under the FDI Act are slightly
broader than its powers to resolve a nonbank SIFI under the OLA, even though
the OLA was modeled on the bank receivership provisions of the FDI Act. The
FDIC may be appointed as either the conservator or receiver of a bank108 but
may only be appointed as receiver of a nonbank SIFI. 09 Under a
conservatorship, the FDIC has the power to take temporary control of a bank
SIFI, with the goal of rehabilitating, reorganizing or recapitalizing it, and then
returning it to the private sector. There is no requirement to liquidate the
institution, and the FDIC normally would not do so without converting the
conservatorship to a receivership. Creditors are permanently stayed from
exercising close-out rights on QFCs based solely on the insolvency of the bank
or the appointment of the FDIC as conservator.
In contrast, the FDIC's job in a receivership is to liquidate the failed
institution. The Treasury Department's original proposal included a provision
allowing the FDIC to take a nonbank SIFI into conservatorship, which the
House of Representatives relabeled as a "qualified" receivership. However,
Congress ultimately stripped this provision from the Dodd-Frank Act." 0
105. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12) (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(13)(C), 124 Stat. at 1492-93
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(13)(C)).
106. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(G)(ii) (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(8)(A), (c)(10)(B), 124
Stat. at 1481, 1491 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)(A), (c)(10)(B)).
107. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(4)(A), 124 Stat. at 1466
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(4)(A)).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2006).
109. Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1444-45 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5382(a)(1)(A)).
110. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM-A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 77-78 (2010), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport web.pdf ("The tools available to Treasury
[and the FDIC] should include the ability to establish conservatorship or receivership for a failing
firm."), with H.R. 3996, 111th Cong. § 1604(a) (2009) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to
appoint the FDIC "as receiver or qualfied receiver" (emphasis added)), and Dodd-Frank Act § 204(b),
124 Stat. at 1455 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384(b)) (specifying that "the [FDIC] shall act as the
receiver").
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The FDIC's obligation to liquidate an institution placed in receivership is
nonetheless far less significant than it is sometimes made out to be."' This
obligation is only binding in the most technical sense; before liquidating the
institution, the FDIC has almost unfettered discretion to transfer any or all of
the firm's assets and liabilities to a third party or bridge entity, without the need
to obtain counterparty or judicial consent.l 12 It has the power to operate a
bridge entity as if it were the bridge's conservator while leaving only an empty
carcass subject to the liquidation obligation.
Assuming that a bank or nonbank SIFI has sufficient unencumbered assets
to pledge to the Federal Reserve or transfer to a bridge, the bank or bridge
would be eligible for any of the Federal Reserve's emergency liquidity
facilities that are properly established under its discount window or section
13(3) authorities.' 13 In addition, the FDIC has authority to provide almost
unlimited funding to a bridge bank or a bank in conservatorship, subject only to
the least-cost-alternative test.l14 The FDIC also has the authority to provide
emergency funding to either a nonbank SIFI in receivership or a bridge entity
established under the OLA, subject only to the limits in the OLA. 15
Although the FDIC is generally subject to equal-treatment and absolute-
priority rules similar to those contained in the Bankruptcy Code, it has more
discretion than a bankruptcy judge to make exceptions to those rules if
necessary to maximize the value of a SIFI or avoid severe harm to the financial
system.116 Thus, it has the discretion to transfer all of the deposits and other
short-term liabilities of a bank or nonbank SIFI in receivership to a
creditworthy third party or bridge entity, if necessary to achieve those goals.117
The FDIC has this discretion even if the transfer results in more favorable
treatment for the transferred creditors than for similarly situated creditors who
are left behind, or if it destroys setoff rights, subject to certain conditions.
These conditions include the following: that the FDIC must transfer either all or
none of the QFCs with a particular counterparty and its affiliates;"'8 that left-
behind creditors must receive their minimum recovery right (similar to their
111. See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, The Error at the Heart of the Dodd-Frank Act, FIN. SERV.
OUTLOOK, Aug.-Sept. 2011, at 9, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/FSO-201 1-September-
Wallison.pdf ("But [the] possibility [of preserving going-concern value] is cut short by the [Dodd-Frank
Act], which requires the liquidation of any financial firm put into the orderly resolution process.
Workout and reorganization are not an option.").
112. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(1)(B) (2006); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(h)(5), 124 Stat. 1375, 1462) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5390(h)(5)).
113. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 343, 347b (2006).
114. Id. §§ 1821(n)(7), 1823(c).
115. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n), (o), 124 Stat. at 1463 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n), (o)).
116. See supra note 68.
117. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(3) (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(D), (h), 124 Stat. at
1461, 1496-1504 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(D), (h)).
118. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(9)(A); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(9)(A), 124 Stat. at 1489-90




right under the Bankruptcy Code's "best interests of creditors" rule);119 that
under the OLA, holders of destroyed setoff rights must have priority over
general creditors;120 and that under the OLA, transferred creditors must be
subject to having "excess benefits" clawed back if the FDIC is saddled with
any losses from the receivership. 21
The FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and certain other federal financial
agencies, have the collective power to facilitate cross-border resolutions of a
global SIFI. One or more of them can require bank and nonbank SIFIs to
prepare living wills and to otherwise engage in contingency planning. 122The
regulators have the authority to determine the credibility of these living wills' 23
and to enter into bilateral or multilateral cooperation and coordination
agreements with foreign bankruptcy courts or resolution agencies. This
framework for cooperation and coordination with foreign courts and agencies
represents one of the landmark advantages of the administrative resolution
process over an Article III or bankruptcy court process.
B. Recapitalizations Within Resolution
Under the FDI Act, the FDIC's technique of choice in resolving banks has
been to sell a whole bank to a third party through a purchase and assumption
transaction, with or without loss-sharing, in a competitive bidding process.124
This technique was used to resolve Washington Mutual and almost all of the
insured depository institutions that have failed since 2007.125 This structure
works well with small and medium-sized banks, but it could have serious
limitations when applied to bank and nonbank SIFIs during a financial panic.
For one thing, it may be difficult to find any third parties that are large enough
and confident enough to purchase a SIFI at the bottom of the market during a
financial panic, much less to find enough such suitors to conduct an effective
auction. As a result, there is a serious risk that any bid for all or part of a SIFI's
119. Under both title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDI Act, the minimum recovery right
is what the left-behind creditors would have received in a liquidation. Title II further specifies that this
hypothetical liquidation is a Chapter 7 liquidation. See supra note 69; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 11 29(a)(7)(A)(ii)
(providing the "best interests of creditors" rule in bankruptcy).
120. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(12)(F), 124 Stat. at 1474 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5390(a)(12)(F)).
121. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. -L. No. 111-203, §
210(o)(1)(D), 124 Stat. 1375, 1509-10 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(D)).
122. See, e.g., id. § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1426-27 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)); DAVIS
POLK & WARDWELL LLP & MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 46.
123. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1426-27 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)).
124. See I FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994
(1998); An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s, in 1 FDIC, HISTORY OF
THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE (1997), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history; FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at 19-40.
125. See, e.g., Douglas & Guynn, supra note 11, at 331-38; Press Release, FDIC, JPMorgan
Chase Acquires Banking Operations of Washington Mutual (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html.
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business will be at a fire-sale price that does not maximize the value of the
SIFI's business for the benefit of its creditors and the financial system as a
whole. At the same time, such a sale could also result in greater concentration
in a market. The FDIC's purchase and assumption method may therefore result
in higher social costs than a taxpayer-funded bailout when used to resolve a
SIFI during a financial panic.
One promising alternative is for the FDIC to use its resolution powers to
recapitalize the systemically important and otherwise viable portions of a failed
SIFI's business. A detailed version of this proposal was submitted to the FDIC
in a joint comment letter that I drafted on behalf of the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association and The Clearing House Association.12 6 The
comment letter was based on a discussion I had with two of my law-firm
partnersl27 following a meeting with the U.S. Department of the Treasury to
discuss the proposed OLA and various European bail-in proposals, and on a
model subsequently developed by J.P. Morgan and certain other U.S. and non-
U.S. banks. The proposed technique calls on the FDIC to use its powers to
transfer the systemically important and viable part of a SIFI's business to a
bridge entity and exchange any remaining claims against the SIFI for equity in
the bridge, in accordance with the priority of the remaining claims.128 In effect,
the FDIC would divide the failed SIFI into a "good bank" and a "bad bank,"
transfer the good bank to a bridge, and leave the bad bank behind. The business
transferred to the bridge bank would be recapitalized by exchanging claims
against the bad bank for equity in the bridge bank, and the bad bank would be
liquidated.129
This technique should provide a means for resolving SIFIs in a way that
produces lower social costs than either a taxpayer-funded bailout or a fire-sale
liquidation. If the FDIC's bank and nonbank resolution powers can be used to
achieve such a result, then a credible alternative will exist to these two evils. To
126. SIFMA & Clearing House Comment Letter, supra note 45.
127. They are Donald Bernstein, Head of Davis Polk's Insolvency and Restructuring Practice,
and John Douglas, Head of Davis Polk's Bank Regulatory Practice and former General Counsel to the
FDIC.
128. The power to do so arises out of the provisions that grant to the FDIC, as receiver, all of
the rights and powers of the shareholders, directors and management of the institution in receivership,
and grant the FDIC the power to establish bridge entities, transfer any and all assets and liabilities of the
institution in receivership to such bridge entities, administer the claims process against the receivership,
and provide claimants with interests in a bridge entity in partial or full satisfaction of their claims against
the receivership, in accordance with the priority of claims set forth in the statute. See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d), (n) (2006); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11l-
203, § 210(a), (h), 124 Stat. 1375, 1460, 1462 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a), (h)).
129. As a practical matter, this process would not take place overnight. Once the "good bank"
has been stabilized and is operating in the ordinary course of business-a step that could take weeks or
months-the FDIC would begin to determine how and when distributions should be made to creditors of
the old bank. Like a bankruptcy judge in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding, the FDIC would
conduct an orderly process for submitting claims, allowing claims, resolving disputed claims, and
making interim distributions. The process might include the creation of a distribution reserve to hold




show that this technique should be capable of achieving this result, consider the
example introduced in Section I.C of this Essay.
Faced with the failure of the SIFI described in this example, the FDIC
would establish a bridge and transfer all of the assets of the SIFI to the bridge.
The bridge would therefore receive $950 billion worth of assets, valued at their
going-concern value. The FDIC would only transfer $850 billion worth of
liabilities, however, in order to ensure that the business transferred to the bridge
is properly recapitalized with tangible common equity equal to approximately
ten percent of total assets. The FDIC would replace those senior managers, if
any, who were responsible for the failure, but retain or attract the managers best
suited to help operate the business going forward.
The FDIC would exchange the $150 billion in claims left behind for all of
the common equity in the bridge in accordance with their pre-insolvency
priorities.130 That equity would provide an ownership interest to the former
creditors with a value of $100 billion. If necessary to preserve or restore public
confidence in the financial system and avoid harm to the financial system, the
FDIC might choose to transfer to the bridge all of the failed SIFI's short-term
creditors who are in a position to run. A sufficient portion of the subordinated
debt and other long-term or intercompany creditors who are not in a position to
run would be left behind, and would have their claims exchanged for equity in
the bridge. As long as the value of the equity provided to these creditors in
exchange for their claims is equal to or greater than their pro-rata share of the
liquidation value of the firm's assets, these long-term creditors would receive
their statutorily-required minimum recovery.
Finally, a combination of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve would
provide temporary emergency funding on a secured basis at penalty rates to the
bridge until it was able to replace this funding with permanent funding at
market rates from the private sector. Because the bridge would be capitalized at
a tangible common leverage ratio of approximately ten percent and would be
paying for the emergency funding at penalty rates, it would be able and highly
130. A rule requiring equity to be distributed in accordance with pre-insolvency priorities
would require the FDIC to value the equity being distributed, if an absolute priority rule were followed
as would normally be the case in a corporate reorganization. Under such a rule, if the value of the equity
being distributed is not sufficient to satisfy all left-behind claims in full, only the most senior $100
billion of claims would receive any equity, and the rest of the claims would be wiped out. This could
lead to serious disputes about valuations if made during a financial crisis when valuations are very
difficult to determine. One way to avoid the need to value the equity and to preserve the potential for
recovery by the most junior classes would be to follow a relative-priority rule instead of the traditional
absolute priority rule. Under a relative-priority rule, instead of distributing a single class of common
equity in the bridge, the FDIC would cause the bridge to issue equity in different classes of seniority,
such as senior preferred stock, junior preferred stock, common stock, and warrants. The more senior
equity securities would be distributed to the more senior claimants and the more junior equity securities
would be distributed to the more junior claimants. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein,
Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930 (2006);
James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Securities
Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928).
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motivated to obtain private sector funding at market rates as soon as the
financial panic recedes or the market regains confidence that the new firm has a
viable business going forward.
The social costs of this recapitalization would be $50 billion (the gross
write down of $150 billion, less the $100 billion value of the new common
equity received in satisfaction of the debt claims), plus the costs of the
emergency funding at the penalty rate. If implemented properly, this procedure
would avoid the catastrophic social costs of a fire-sale liquidation, both in
terms of lost value to the SIFI's creditors and in terms of the risk of severe
harm to the financial system. At the same time, it would avoid the social costs
associated with increased moral hazard from a taxpayer-funded bailout: senior
managers responsible for the failure will have lost their jobs, and the firm's
shareholders and creditors will have borne all of the SIFI's losses and paid the
penalty rate for the emergency funding. In short, by using its resolution powers
in this manner, the FDIC would have resolved the institution in a manner that
produced lower social costs than either a taxpayer-funded bailout or a fire-sale
liquidation. Thus, recapitalization within resolution should be a credible
alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts.
C. Important Considerations: Prudence, Wisdom, and Skill
While these powers should be among the most useful tools in the
regulatory toolbox if properly used, they could also become the most dangerous
new tools through unwise or unskillful use. To illustrate this potential, compare
the FDIC's resolution authorities to a power tool such as a table saw. When
used properly, a table saw is much more efficient than a manual saw. In the
wrong hands, however, its saw-toothed blade, spinning at over 3000 rotations
per minute, can be exceptionally dangerous. What makes particular hands the
wrong hands? Among other factors, a lack of practice and a failure to consider
the differences in the type of wood being worked. A beginner who is
accustomed to working with white pine-a soft, dry wood-would not
necessarily be prepared to work with cedar-a hard, gummy wood.
Although the FDIC has considerable experience resolving community and
medium-sized banks under its bank-receivership authority, it has no experience
resolving a global SIFI. The businesses and balance sheets of global SIFIs are
very different from and more complex than those of community and regional
banks. For example, among the large community and regional banks and thrifts
that failed between 2008 and 2010, approximately ninety-seven percent of
liabilities on average consisted of domestic deposits and secured borrowings
from the Federal Reserve or the Federal Home Loan Bank System.131 In
131. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SIMPLIFIED BALANCE SHEETS FOR ALL BANKS AND




contrast, among the six largest bank holding companies in the United States at
the end of 2009, the corresponding figure was less than forty-five percent.132
Not only have foreign deposits typically been excluded from FDIC deposit
insurance, they do not enjoy the same depositor preference as domestic deposits
unless they are payable at a domestic office.' 33 Instead, they are generally
ranked equally with the claims of general creditors.1 34
Because bank and nonbank financial institutions tend to fail in large
bunches or waves, with decades between each wave, there is a substantial risk
that the FDIC will find itself in the role of an amateur carpenter who does not
use his table saw often enough to retain his skill. In addition, because of the
substantial differences between the balance sheets and operations of a global
SIR and a community or regional bank, the FDIC may be like a carpenter
working with unfamiliar wood. If so, these otherwise useful tools would be
dangerous instruments in the hands of a well-intentioned but unskilled
craftsman, a menace to himself and to his work.
D. Important Considerations: Cross-Border Cooperation
A full discussion and analysis of the impediments to cross-border
resolutions are beyond the scope of this Essay. It is worth noting, however, that
the resolution model should be more effective than the bankruptcy model in
identifying and addressing impediments to cross-border resolutions. Financial
regulatory agencies are in a better position than judges to identify and design
solutions for any impediments through the living will process or through
bilateral discussions with foreign resolution authorities.
One obvious impediment, which has already been identified above, is the
need for host-country authorities to have the discretionary power to cooperate
with home-country resolution authorities to facilitate a cross-border resolution.
Although U.S. law authorizes the FDIC to transfer all of the assets and
liabilities of a bank or nonbank SIFI to a bridge without counterparty or judicial
consent, that authority cannot override the conditions for a valid transfer of
assets, liabilities, or contracts located in foreign countries, or the foreign
change-in-control requirements for foreign branches or affiliates. Those
conditions and requirements are governed by foreign law, and U.S. law cannot
override them extraterritorially. In addition, U.S. law cannot prevent a foreign
regulatory authority or court from ring-fencing local assets to satisfy local
DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 1-2 (May 2011), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/Combined.Bank.Balance.Sheets.pdf.
132. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 93, at 1. Specific figures ranged from a
low of under 26% for the Goldman Sachs Group to a high of 70% for Wells Fargo & Co. Id. Among the
holding companies' bank subsidiaries, domestic deposits and secured liabilities accounted for an average
of 67% of liabilities, with a low of 34% for Citibank and a high of 96% for Morgan Stanley. Id.
133. See National Depositor Preference Amendment, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 3001(a), 107 Stat.
312, 336 (1993) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(1 1)).
134. See id
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liabilities, even if this is an impediment to a value-maximizing, systemic-risk-
minimizing cross-border resolution. Thus, the FDIC and other U.S. regulatory
agencies have no choice but to coordinate and cooperate with foreign
regulators, legal bodies, and courts to facilitate a cross-border resolution of a
global SIFI with its headquarters in the United States.
The recapitalization-within-resolution model should facilitate such cross-
border cooperation by helping the FDIC to persuade foreign authorities that it is
in their interest to cooperate with the cross-border resolution and not to ring-
fence foreign assets. This is because cooperating with a well-run
recapitalization of the viable part of the SIFI's business should produce
substantially more value for all creditors than a fire-sale liquidation pursuant to
local ring-fencing. Once again, then, a well-designed recapitalization-within-
resolution should mitigate the potentially catastrophic collateral consequences
to the global financial system that could result from a fire-sale liquidation.
E. Important Considerations: Enhanced Due Process Safeguards
Advocates of the proposed new Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code have
criticized the OLA (though not the FDI Act's bank receivership provisions on
which it was modeled) for giving the FDIC a dangerous amount of discretion;
they claim the FDIC is insufficiently constrained by due process safeguards
designed to protect against incompetence, political manipulation, favoritism,
and other potential problems.135 These criticisms reflect a legitimate concern
that the extraordinary discretion provided to the FDIC might permit a future
FDIC to turn its resolution authorities into a sort of financial Star Chamber.13 6
At the extreme, leaders in authoritarian countries have sometimes used
discretionary powers to nationalize the financial system for political reasons, in
order to punish political enemies and reward favorites.137 While such an abuse
of discretion is far less likely in a democratic country like the United States,
135. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 65, at 122; Wallison, supra note 11l; Jackson, supra note
17, at i-ii, 1-6 to -7, 1-13.
136. The Court of Star Chamber was established during a war-tom period in medieval
England to ensure the fair enforcement of laws against nobles who were able to escape justice in the
ordinary courts. Its proceedings were closed to the public and many of the traditional due process
protections were suspended for the sake of efficiency and to avoid allowing the guilty to go free based
on legal technicalities. It was initially well-regarded because of its speed and flexibility, but over time, it
evolved into a political weapon used by the monarch to punish enemies and favor friends. See generally
Emory Washburn, The Court of Star Chamber, 12 AM. L.R. 21 (1877) (describing the history of the
Court of Star Chamber). The court has come to symbolize "a system of arbitrary measures, where the
forms ofjudicial proceedings are made the means of perpetrating acts of injustice, or of consummating
schemes of oppression and wrong." Id. at 21.
137. For example, the Soviets nationalized the Soviet banking system in 1918, see GEORGE
GARVY, MONEY, FINANCIAL FLOWS, AND CREDIT IN THE SOVIET UNION 24 (1977), and Benito
Mussolini nationalized the Italian banking system in 1933, see ALEXANDER J. DE GRAND, FASCIST




with built-in checks and balances, appropriate due process protections-at least
on an ex post basis-can further insulate the process against abuse or error.m
As discussed in Section M.A, one of the principal advantages of the
Bankruptcy Code is its superior due process safeguards. Unfortunately, these
same safeguards prevent the Code from providing a credible alternative to
taxpayer-funded bailouts during a financial panic. This necessarily results in
certain compromises regarding ex ante due process, which are justified on the
basis of the principle that justice delayed can be justice denied when a SIFI's
liquidation value rapidly approaches zero during a financial crisis.
Just because some ex ante due process safeguards may need to be
sacrificed in favor of speed and flexibility, however, does not mean that they
should be discarded unnecessarily, or that substitute ex post protections should
not be provided. Nor does it mean that Congress has struck the right balance
between discretion and due process in the OLA or the FDI Act. Certain
measures that could improve the balance involve the traditional due process
safeguard of judicial review. These include subjecting the administrative claims
process to full, contemporaneous judicial review, without interfering with the
FDIC's power to exercise its "core" resolution powers with greater dispatch by
transferring a firm's assets and liabilities to a bridge, recapitalizing the business
transferred to the bridge, and providing temporary funding to the bridge. In
addition, these may include establishing an efficient judicial process for
claimants to bring individual actions against the FDIC in a single collective
proceeding.
Other measures would impose greater oversight over the FDIC. Congress
might choose to create a systemic resolution board consisting of representatives
from the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and the FDIC to direct and oversee the
FDIC's bank and nonbank resolution powers; require the FDIC to make an
annual report to Congress, describing how it has used its resolution powers and
how it would plan to use them in the event of a future financial panic; and
mandate that it disclose publicly all material information related to the sale of
any financial institution, including material agreements and statistical
information about the number of bidders, types of bidders, range of bidding
prices, winning price, and other material terms and conditions. Yet other
measures would alter in subtle but important ways the FDIC's statutory
authorities. For example, Congress might require the FDIC to issue
comprehensive regulations clarifying the rights of stakeholders of bank SIFIs,
as it must now do for nonbank stakeholders under the OLA; extend the OLA's
due process protections to the FDI Act, including clarified equal treatment and
absolute or relative priority rules, minimum recovery rights, setoff rights, and
138. One possible model for such ex post safeguards is the process by which Congress
compensated creditors who were affected by the reorganization of bankrupt northeastern railroads into
the Consolidated Rail Corporation in the early 1970s. See Note, Valuation of Conrail Under the Fifth
Amendment, 90 HARV. L. REv. 596, 596-97 (1977) (describing statutory compensation mechanism).
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suspension of cross-affiliate defaults; and confirm the FDIC's duty to maximize
the value of an institution in receivership for the benefit of its creditors, subject
only to actions deemed necessary to prevent severe harm to the financial
system. Finally, other measures would improve the FDIC's procedures, such as
by providing secured creditors with the right to credit bid for their own
collateral as a protection against valuation disputes with the FDIC, 139 or by
establishing standards and procedures for determining hypothetical liquidation
value that defines each creditor's minimum recovery entitlement.
Conclusion
The FDIC's new and traditional resolution powers have the potential to
provide a credible alternative to the choice between the two evils of taxpayer-
funded bailouts and a disorderly liquidation or value-destroying reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Code. Because most failures of banks and other financial
institutions come in waves during financial panics, with almost no failures
during the decades between these extraordinary events, the FDIC will not have
the opportunity to use these tools very often. In addition, the balance sheets and
businesses of SIFIs are very different from those of the community or regional
banks with which the FDIC has the most experience. As a result, the bank and
nonbank orderly resolution authorities will be like power tools that are used
only rarely, on new and unfamiliar objects. If used properly to effect a value-
maximizing recapitalization of the systemically important and other viable part
of a SIFI's business, they should provide a credible alternative to taxpayer-
funded bailouts. If used unwisely, unskillfully, or unscrupulously, however,
they have the potential to be the most dangerous tools in the regulatory toolkit.
The risk of these potential dangers can be mitigated by enhanced due process
safeguards.
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139. That is, a secured creditor would be allowed to use a portion of its claim equal to the
FDIC's valuation of the collateral to bid for possession and control of the collateral, resulting in the
claim being reduced by the amount of the credit bid.
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